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Abstract
In this work we analyze the problem of knowledge representation in a collaborative multi-agent system
where agents can obtain new information from others through communication. Namely, we analyze several
approaches of belief revision in multi-agent systems. We will describe different research lines in this topic and
we will focus on Belief Revision using Information from Multiple Sources. For this, we are going to accomplish
a comparative analysis of different models of belief revision that use information from multiple sources.
Key words: Multi-Agent Systems, Revision, Plausibility, Comparison.
1 INTRODUCTION
The problem of belief revision (BR) has been widely discussed in the past twenty years [1, 2, 10].
In belief revision theory, new information must be adopted and some existing information will be
dropped to accommodate it. However, many researchers argued that new information should not al-
ways have the priority over the existing information and some non-prioritized belief revision methods
have been proposed in which new information is not necessarily accepted [6, 8, 11, 15].
An essential skill an autonomous agent should possess is the ability to revise its beliefs in a
coherent and rational fashion when it receives new information. Most BR research, however, has
been developed with a single agent in mind, i.e., only one problem solver using the BR service.
Multi-Agent Systems (MASs) are distributed computing systems composed of a number of in-
teracting computational entities. One important characteristic distinguishing MASs from traditional
distributed systems is that both MAS and its components (agents) are intelligent. As MASs become
increasingly attractive for solving larger and more complex problems, the need for adequate BR tech-
nology in the MAS paradigm arises. Only a few BR frameworks are known that claim to be suited
for MAS applications. There exist different fashions to cope to the consistency maintenance in MAS.
In Section 2, a BR hierarchy is presented to clarify the terminologies adopted in resent research on
Multi-Agent Belief Revision (MABR).
In this work, namely we are interested in the stages where several deliberative agents are involved
in a MAS and they can receive new information from others through communication. Belief Revision
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in this type scene is called Belief Revision using Information from Multiple Sources (MSBR). More-
over, recently we have presented an article [16] where we defined a new operator of Belief Revision
which it is based on a credibility order among agents.
In this paper, we are going to accomplish a comparative analysis between our approach [16] and
different models of MSBR. Specifically, we will compare our approach with one proposed by Dragoni
in [4] and other proposed by Cantwell in [3].
This paper is organized as follows. Next section introduces an exhaustive analysis of the MABR
approaches. In the third section a brief description of our revision operator will be given. Then, in
the fourth section we will compare our approach with the presented by Dragoni. In the fifth section,
the comparison of our proposal will be done with the Cantwell’s proposal. Finally, conclusions are
included.
2 BELIEF REVISION IN MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS
A variety of notations have been adopted by researchers investigating Belief Revision in Multi-Agent
Systems. A good understanding of the relationships between these approaches is essential before
carrying out any further research. In [13] an exhaustive analysis of these approaches is presented and
a very interesting hierarchy is introduced (See Figure 1). Observe that in the hierarchy, Multi-Agent
Belief Revision and Belief Revision using information from Multiple Sources are distinguished.
As stated in [13], BR could be considered as part of the agent’s skills to maintain the consistency
of its own epistemic state. In this case, an individual BR process is carried out in a multi-agent
environment, where the new information may come from multiple sources and maybe conflict. BR in
this sense is called MSBR by [5]. Cantwell [3] tries to resolve conflicting information by ordering the
information sources on the basis of their trustworthiness. This could be served as a rational way of
generating the new information credibility based on the source reliability using the terms of MSBR.
However, as discussed in [13], BR could also be used to achieve a society’s or team’s mutual
belief goals (e.g. reaching consensus before carrying out plans). In this setting, more than one agent
takes part in the process. In order to pursue the mutual goal, agents involved need to communicate,
cooperate, coordinate and negotiate with one another. A MABR system is a MAS whose mutual goal
involves BR.
MSBR studies individual agent revision behaviors, i.e., when an agent receives information from
multiple agents towards whom it has social opinions. MABR investigates the overall BR behavior of
agent teams or a society. MSBR is one of the essential components of MABR.
The AGM paradigm [2] has been widely accepted as a standard framework for BR. But it is only
capable of prescribing revision behaviors of a single agent. The BR process is more complex in
multiple agent case. Besides the Principle of Minimal Change, there exist other requisites due to the
sophisticated agent interactions.
An agent is capable of carrying out Individual Belief Revision (IBR), while an agent society or
team is capable of MABR. IBR in a single agent environment (Single Belief Revision, SBR) could
be achieved using classical BR satisfying or adapting AGM postulates. IBR in a multiple agent
environment is MSBR, i.e., a single agent will have to process information coming from more than
one source.
Different formalisms have been presented to deal with MABR [13, 14, 12]. In [13, 14] an ontology
to solve MABR is defined. That is, in these papers three major categories of heterogeneity, namely
social, semantic and syntactic heterogeneity are clarified. There, is shown that several issues posed
by such heterogeneities are addressed in the context of BR. They also propose the use of ontology as
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a tool to handle the heterogeneity issues so as to achieve the necessary reliable communication and
system interoperability required by MABR.
In [12] research on MABR in the context of heterogeneous systems is initiated. The Private
Domains (PDi) and the Shared Domain (SD) of the agent knowledge base are defined in order to
capture a general setting where each agent has private beliefs as well as beliefs shared with other
agents. Under such knowledge structure, each agent may have its own perspective of the world but
needs to coordinate (i.e. agree on) its belief on shared elements. The shared domain also defines the
communication language for the agents.
In contrast to these last two proposals [13, 14, 12], in our approach [16] we have focused on
MSBR, where agents maintain the consistence of their belief bases. Since an agent can receive infor-
mation that is contradictory with its own beliefs, in order to maintain its belief base consistent, it has
to decide whether to accept or reject the new information. If an agent decides to accept a new belief
that is contradictory with its belief base, then it has to select some beliefs from its belief base in order
to withdraw them and avoid the contradiction.
Similarly to Dragoni [4] and Cantwel [3], in our approach, informant agents can have different
credibility and this credibility is used to decide which information prevails when a contradiction
arises. However, there are differences with these authors, which will be analyzed in this work.
In our approach, a credibility order among agents was defined, and this order is used by all the
participants of the multi-agent system. In [16] we have assumed that the credibility order among
agents is fixed. To decide whether to reject or accept a new belief, a comparison criterion among
beliefs was defined. As it will be explained in detail below, this comparison criterion (that we call
plausibility) is based on the credibility order among agents.
3 NON-PRIORITIZED REVISION USING PLAUSIBILITY
This section gives a brief description of an operator that we have defined for multi-source belief
revision (recently presented in NMR 2008 [16]).
3.1 Epistemic Model
In our approach [16], we considered a finite set of agents identifiers that will be denoted as Agents.
Since agents can obtain information from other agents, agents’ beliefs are represented as tuples (α,A),
where A ∈ Agents and α is a sentence of a propositional language L.
Let K = 2L×Agents, each agent A ∈ Agents has a belief base KA ∈ K. As stated above, in this
approach informant agents are ranked by their credibilities. Hence, a Credibility Order over the set
Agents is introduced:
Definition 1 A credibility order among agents, denoted by infix ‘≤Co’, is a total order overAgents,
where A1 ≤Co A2 means that A2 is at least as credible as A1. The strict relation A1 <Co A2,
representing A2 is strictly more credible than A1, is defined as A1 ≤Co A2 and A2 6≤Co A1. Moreover,
A1 =Co A2 means that A1 is as credible as A2, and it holds when A1 ≤Co A2 and A2 ≤Co A1.
Example 1 Consider a set Agents = {A1, A2, A3, A4} where the credibility order is A1 ≤Co A2,
A2 ≤Co A3, A3 ≤Co A2, A3 ≤Co A4. Note that A2 is as credible as A3. The belief base of the agent
A1 is KA1 = {(β,A1), (α,A2), (α,A3), (α → β,A2), (α → β, A4), (ω,A1), (ω → β,A4), (α →
δ, A2), (δ → β,A1), (γ,A2), (γ,A3), (γ → ², A2), (²→ β,A2), (²→ β,A3), (²→ β,A4)}. Observe
that KA1 has three tuples with the sentence ² → β. Although this can be considered as redundancy,
each one comes from a different informant agent. The reasons for maintaining all of them will be
explained below.
Besides, in [16] two auxiliary functions was introduced in order to obtain the set of sentences
(resp. set of agents) that belong to a belief base K ∈ K.
Definition 2 The sentence function, Sen : K 7→ 2L, is a function such that for a given belief base
K ∈ K, Sen(K) = {α : (α,A) ∈ K for any A in Agents}.
Definition 3 The agent identifier function, Ag : K 7→ 2Agents, is a function such that for a given
belief base K ∈ K, Ag(K) = {A : (α,A) ∈ K for any α in L}.
As stated above, agents can receive new beliefs from other informants. This new information
can be contradictory with their current beliefs. For instance, consider again the belief base (KA1) of
Example 1, where Sen(KA1) ` β (observe that there are several derivations for β). Suppose now
that the agent A1 receives the input (¬β,A4). It is clear that adding (¬β,A4) to KA1 will produce
an inconsistent belief base. Therefore, the agent has to revise its beliefs and decide whether it rejects
(¬β,A4) or it withdraws β. The credibility order is used to decide which information prevails. How-
ever, since there can be several derivations of β, then we have to “cut” all of them. For doing that, all
the minimal subsets of KA1 that entails β will be obtained, using an extension of Kernel contractions.
Kernel contractions introduced in [10] are based on a selection among the sentences that are
relevant to derive the sentence to be retracted. In order to perform a contraction, kernel contractions
use incision functions which cut into the minimal subsets that imply the information to be given up.
We have adapted the notion of kernel contraction to our epistemic model. First, we will define the
kernel set (Definition 4) and then we will present incision functions (Definition 11) that will cut beliefs
according to their plausibility (Definition 8).
Definition 4 Let K ∈ K and α ∈ L. Then H ∈ K⊥⊥α if and only if
1. H ⊆ K.
2. Sen(H) ` α.
3. if H ′ ⊂ H , then Sen(H ′) 6` α.
The set of minimal subsets of a belief base K ∈ K that imply α (denoted K⊥⊥α) is called a kernel
set. Note that each α-kernel (H ∈ K⊥⊥α) is a set of tuples from K.
The information (α,Ap) that an agent Ai receives from Ap could be consistent with its current
belief base KAi if Sen(KAi) 6` α or Sen(KAi) ` α. If Sen(KAi) 6` α, then it is clear that (α,Ap) is
added to KAi . If Sen(KAi) ` α then (α,Ap) is also added to KAi because the plausibility of α may
increase (see Section 3.2). Therefore, a belief base K ∈ K may contain the same belief in two tuples
with different agents identifiers (for instance, {(α,A1), (α,A2)} ⊆ K). Thus, we may say that K has
redundant information or we may say that K is redundant. In Example 1 the sentence ² → β is in
three tuples. From the tuples point of view there is no redundancy, due to each tuple represent to a
different informant.
In the following section we will show how the new operator uses the additional information
(agents identifiers) in order to guide the revision process. The plausibility of the sentences will be
defined by using the agents identifiers stored in the belief bases of the agents and the credibility order
among agents.
3.2 Sentences Plausibility
The agents identifiers (which are in the second field of the tuples) represent the information that will
be used to compute the plausibility of the beliefs. That is, each agent’s belief will have an associated
plausibility that will depend on the agent identifier and the credibility order among agents. The
behavior of the plausibility is similar to the epistemic entrenchment defined in [9]. That is, if α and β
are sentences in L, the notation α ¹KA β will be used as a shorthand for “β is at least as plausible as
α relative to the belief base K of the agent A”.
One belief base K ∈ K may contain either explicit sentences or entailed sentences. As stated
above, the explicit sentences are those contained in Sen(K). The entailed sentences are those such
that they are not in Sen(K) but they are entailed by sentences in Sen(K). In order to obtain the
entailed sentences from a belief base K we are going to use the following function:
Definition 5 The belief function, Bel : K 7→ 2L, is a function such that for a given belief base
K ∈ K, K: Bel(K) = {α : α ∈ L and Sen(K) ` α}.
Note that also K may contain explicit sentences that are entailed by Bel(K). Thus we will have
several proofs for the same sentence in K. Therefore, to calculate the plausibility of a sentence (β)
we should analyze all its proofs. In order to achieve this, we are going to use the kernels set. We
consider that this calculation should be cautious. That is, from each β-kernel, we desire to obtain the
less plausible tuples. This plausibility gives us the plausibility of each proof. Then, the plausibility
of a derived sentence β will be the greater plausibility among the plausibilities of each β-kernel. In
order to define that, two functions will be given next.
Definition 6 The less credible source function, min : K 7→ K, is a function such that for a given
belief base K ∈ K, min(K) = {(α,Ai) : (α,Ai) ∈ K and for all (δ, Aj) ∈ K,Ai ≤Co Aj}.
Definition 7 The more credible source function, max : K 7→ K, is a function such that for a given
belief base K ∈ K, max(K) = {(α,Ai) : (α,Ai) ∈ K and for all (δ, Aj) ∈ K,Aj ≤Co Ai}.
Example 2 ConsiderAgents = {A1, A2, A3}whereA1 ≤Co A2 ≤Co A3. LetKA1 = {(α,A1), (α,A2),
(β,A1), (γ,A1), (α→ γ,A3)} be the belief base of A1. Then,
• Bel(KA1) will contain the sentences from Sen(KA1) plus the sentences derived by “`”. For
instance, α, β, γ, α ∨ β, α ∨ β ∨ γ, . . . , and so on.
• min(KA1) = {(α,A1), (β,A1), (γ,A1)}.
• max(KA1) = {(α→ γ,A3)}.
Next, we will introduce a function that returns the plausibility of a sentence that can be explicitly
in K or inferred from K.
Definition 8 The Plausibility function, Pl : L × K 7→ Agents, is a function such that for a given




It is important to note that if (γ,A1) ∈ KA1 then Pl(γ,KA1) could be different from A1. For
instance, consider the Example 2, then Pl(α,KA1) = A2, Pl(β,KA1) = A1 and Pl(γ,KA1) = A2.
Definition 9 Plausibility Criterion. Let KA ∈ K be the belief base of the agent A and let {α, β} ⊆
Bel(KA), then α ¹KA β if and only if Pl(α,KA) ≤Co Pl(β,KA).
The strict relation α ≺KA β, representing “β is more plausible than α”, is defined as “α ¹KA β
and β KA α”. Moreover, α 'KA β means that α is as plausible as β, and it holds when α ¹KA β and
β ¹KA α. From the previous definition we can observe that the plausibility of the sentences inherits
the properties of the credibility order among agents (‘¹KA’ is a total order on L). Furthermore, note
that the relation ‘¹KA’ is only defined with respect to a given KA (different belief bases may be
associated with different ordering of plausibility, in Example 3 this situation is shown).
Example 3 Consider a set Agents = {A1, A2, A3} where the credibility order is A1 ≤Co A2,
A2 ≤Co A3. Suppose that the agentA2 has the following belief baseKA2 = {(α,A1), (β,A2), (γ,A3)},
and suppose that the agent A3 has the following belief base KA3 = {(α,A1), (β,A3), (γ,A2)}. Then,
for both agents, β is more plausible than α (i.e., α ¹KA2 β and α ¹KA3 β). However, for A2, γ is
more plausible than β (β ¹KA2 γ) whereas for A3, β is more plausible than γ (γ ¹KA3 β).
In the following section, we will define a non-prioritized revision operator that uses the sentences
plausibility in order to guide the revision process.
3.3 Non Prioritized Revision Operator Using Plausibility
In this section, the behavior of the revision operator presented in [16] will be shown. This operator is
based on the sentences plausibility. In case that a belief base K ∈ K is revised by a tuple (α,Ai) we
will have two cases:
• α is consistent with Bel(K). This is the most simple case of characterizing from the logical
point of view because it consists only in the addition of new tuples. In the limit case in which
α ∈ Bel(K) then this operation could increase the plausibility of α.
• α is inconsistent with Bel(K), that is ¬α ∈ Bel(K). This case requires a deeper analysis
because: a) it is necessary to determine when the sentence will be accepted; and b) if the input
is accepted then it is necessary to erase some tuples of K. For the second case we need to define
an incision function on each α-kernel.
We will adapt the incision function definition proposed by [10] to our framework.
Definition 10 An incision function σ for K ∈ K is a function such that for all α
1. σ(K⊥⊥α) ⊆ ∪(K⊥⊥α).
2. if Ø 6= X ∈ K⊥⊥α, then X ∩ σ(K⊥⊥α) 6= Ø
The incision function selects sentences to be discarded. Contracting α from K should be equal to
all the elements of the original set K that are not removed by the incision function.
In the definition of incision function of Hansson’s work is not specified how the function selects the
sentences that will be discarded of each α-kernel. This can be solved with the sentences plausibility
that we have defined above. The incision function σ will select the less plausible sentences of each
α-kernel. Hence, the new operator differs of the kernel revision operator defined by Hansson in the
following issues:
1. The new operator will do an analysis to determine if the revision is necessary.
2. The sentences selection for the incision function will be defined.
According to 1, the new operator permits two options, completely accepts all the input, or com-
pletely rejects all the input. For this reason the new operator is non prioritized. Some non priori-
tized operators of the literature that completely accept or reject the input are Semi-Revision [11] and
Screened Revision [15]. Another operators may partially accept the new information, for instance
Revision by a Set of Sentences [7] and Selective Revision [8].
Next we will define a specific incision function, based on the beliefs plausibility, that will select
the less plausible sentences of each α-kernel (following the principle of minimal change).
Definition 11 σ↓ is a bottom incision function forK if σ↓ is an incision function such that, σ↓(K⊥⊥α) =
{(δ, Ai) : (δ, Ai) ∈ X ∈ K⊥⊥α and for all (β,Aj) ∈ X it holds that Ai ≤Co Aj}.
Example 4 Consider a set Agents = {A1, A2, A3} where the credibility order is A1 ≤Co A2,
A2 ≤Co A3. Suppose that the agent A2 has the following belief base KA2 = {(α,A3), (β,A2),
(β → α,A1), (ω,A1), (ω → α,A3), (δ, A1)}. Then, K⊥⊥A2α = {Ha, Hb, Hc} where
Ha = {(α,A3)}, Hb = {(β,A2), (β → α,A1)}, Hc = {(ω,A1), (ω → α,A3)}.
σ↓(K⊥⊥A2α) = {(α,A3), (β → α,A1), (ω,A1)}.
Now that we have given the necessary background on the behavior of the new operator, the Non-
Prioritized Revision Using Plausibility will be defined.
Definition 12 Let K ∈ K, let α ∈ L, let TopBase be a maximum belief base function, and let K⊥⊥α
be the set of α-kernels of K. Let σ↓ be a bottom incision function for K. The operator “◦”, called
Non-Prioritized Revision Using Plausibility, is defined as follow:
K ◦ (α,Ai)=

K ∪ {(α,Ai)} if ¬α 6∈ Bel(K)
K if ¬α ∈ Bel(K) and Ai ≤Co Pl(¬α,K)
(K\X) ∪ {(α,Ai)} if ¬α ∈ Bel(K) and Pl(¬α,K) <Co Ai
where: X = {(ω,Aj) : ω ∈ Sen(σ↓(K⊥⊥¬α)) and (ω,Aj) ∈ K}.
Example 5 Consider a setAgents = {A1, A2, A3, A4, A5}where the credibility order isA1 ≤Co A2,
A2 ≤Co A3, A3 ≤Co A2, A3 ≤Co A4, A4 ≤Co A5. Suppose that the agent A1 has the following belief
base KA1 = {(β,A1), (α,A2), (α,A3), (α → β,A2), (α → β,A4), (ω,A1), (ω → β,A4), (α →
δ, A2), (δ → β,A1), (γ,A2), (γ,A3), (γ → ², A2), (²→ β,A2), (²→ β,A3), (²→ β,A4)}. Further-
more, we suppose A1 receives the tuple (¬β,A5). Then, A1 should revise KA1 by (¬β,A5). Next we
will describe the behavior of the new operator step by step.
• Step 1. Obtain the minimal subsets that derive β from belief base KA1 .
K⊥⊥A1β = {Ha, Hb, Hc, Hd, He, Hf , Hg, Hh, Hi, Hj, Hk, Hl, Hm, Hn} where
Ha = {(β,A1)}, Hb = {(α,A2), (α→ β,A2)},
Hc = {(α,A2), (α→ β,A4)}, Hd = {(α,A3), (α→ β,A2)},
He = {(α,A3), (α→ β,A4)}, Hf = {(ω,A1), (ω → β,A4)},
Hg = {(α,A2), (α→ δ, A2), (δ → β,A1)}, Hh = {(α,A3), (α→ δ, A2), (δ → β,A1)},
Hi = {(γ,A2), (γ → ², A2), (²→ β,A2)}, Hj = {(γ,A2), (γ → ², A2), (²→ β,A3)},
Hk = {(γ,A2), (γ → ², A2), (²→ β,A4)}, Hl = {(γ,A3), (γ → ², A2), (²→ β,A2)},
Hm = {(γ,A3), (γ → ², A2), (²→ β,A3)} and Hn = {(γ,A3), (γ → ², A2), (²→ β,A4)}.
• Step 2. Apply the bottom incision function “σ↓” to the set of minimal subsets of KA1 to obtain
the less plausible tuples set of each β-kernel.
σ↓(K⊥⊥A1β) = {(β,A1), (α,A2), (α → β,A2), (α,A3), (ω,A1), (δ → β,A1), (γ,A2), (γ →
², A2), (²→ β,A2), (²→ β,A3), (γ,A3)}.
• Step 3. Obtain from the tuples of the previous item, those tuples of greater plausibility with the
more credible source function “max”(max(σ↓(K⊥⊥A1β))).
max({(β,A1), (α,A2), (α→ β,A2), (α,A3), (ω,A1), (δ → β,A1), (γ,A2), (γ → ², A2), (²→
β,A2), (² → β,A3), (γ,A3)}) = {(α,A2), (α → β,A2), (α,A3), (γ,A2), (γ → ², A2), (² →
β,A2), (²→ β,A3), (γ,A3)}.
• Step 4. Compare the agent identifier of the input tuple with the agent identifier of any tuple
obtained from previous item (lets suppose (α,Aj)). If A5 ≤Co Aj the operation has no effect,
the input is rejected, i.e., K ◦ (¬β,A5) = K. On the other hand, if Aj <Co A5 then K ◦
(¬β,A5) = K \ {(ω,Aj) : ω ∈ Sen(σ↓(K⊥⊥¬α)) and (ω,Aj) ∈ K} ∪ {(α,Ai)}.
KA1 ◦ (¬β,A5) = {(ω → β,A4), (α→ δ, A2), (¬β,A5)}.
Remark 1 Note that, since the belief base may be redundant, in step 4 of Example 5 if the revision
gives rise to a contraction then we will discard from K all those tuples whose sentences were selected
by the bottom incision function without regarding the respective informants. Besides, note that our
operator will never discard more plausible sentences than the input. This control can be seen in Step
4 of Example 5.
Remark 2 In this approach, we have assumed that the credibility order among agents is fixed. How-
ever, this order may be replaced and this will not affect the behavior of the operator. If the credibility
order among agents changes, then the plausibility of all sentences may also change without chang-
ing the belief bases of the agents. This feature was one of the motivations for using agent identifiers
instead of representing explicitly the plausibility of sentences as a number. For instance, consider a
set Agents = {A1, A2} where the credibility order is A1 ≤Co A2, KA1 = {(α,A1), (β,A2)} and
KA2 = {(ω,A2), (γ,A1)}. Hence, α ¹KA1 β and γ ¹KA2 ω. If the credibility order changes to
A2 ≤Co A1 then β ¹KA1 α and ω ¹KA2 γ. Note that the tuples in K1 and K2 remain unchanged.
3.4 Retransmission of Information
As stated above, each agent A ∈ Agents will have a belief base KA ∈ K, where K = 2L×Agents.
Hence, the agents store each belief with an agent identifier in tuples. When an agent sends information
to other agent, it sends tuples. Consider for example an agent set {A1, A2, A3} ⊆ Agents where
A1 ≤Co A2 ≤Co A3. Suppose that KA1 = {(α,A3)} then if A1 wants to send α to A2, it has to send
a tuple with an agent identifier. This identifier may be:
• the proper sender identifier (e.g., A1), or
• the agent identifier stored with the belief in the sender’s base (e.g., A3).
Here, we adopt the latter option. That is, A1 will send the tuple (α,A3) to A2. Thus, the receiver
agent A2 will know the source from where the sender A1 has obtained the information.
From the receiver point of view, when it receives from A1 the tuple (α,A3) it may store:
• (α,A3), i.e., the agent identifier stored with the belief in the sender’s base, or
• (α,Ai) where Ai is the agent identifier more credible (according to the credibility order among
agents, Definition 1) that results of comparing the A1 and A3.
Here, we adopt the latter option. Thus, the agents will hold their beliefs with the more credible
informant known. In this case, since A1 ≤Co A3, the receiver agent A2 will apply the new revision
operator over the tuple (α,A3).
4 DRAGONI’S APPROACH VS. OUR APPROACH
In this section a brief summary of the proposal of Dragini in [4, 5] will be given. Besides, we are
going to do a comparison of this proposal with our approach.
In [4, 5] is considered that agents detect and store in tables the nogoods. The nogoods are the
minimally inconsistent subsets of the agents’ knowledge bases. In contrast to this, a good is a subset of
the knowledge base such that: it is not inconsistent (it is not a superset of a nogood), and if augmented
with whatever else assumption in knowledge base it becomes inconsistent. Here, we can note the first
difference. In contrast to our approach, they do not remove beliefs to avoid a contradiction, but,
quite more generally, to choose which is the new preferred good among them in knowledge base. In
our model, we obtain the kernel sets to cut some sentences, thus we broke the contradictions if it is
necessary.
That is, their strategy is similar to the proposal by AGM, “Maxichoice revision” [2]. The contrac-
tions of the type maxichoice are contractions based on a selection operator that chooses one and only
one element of the remains set. In [1], Alchourron and Makinson tried to give a more explicit con-
struction of the contraction process, and hence also of the revision process via the Levi identity. Their
basic idea was to choose A - x as a maximal subset of A that fails to imply x. Contraction functions
defined in this way were called “choice contractions” in [1].
Other difference can be noted in the tuples. Like us, they propose to store additional information
with each sentence. However, their tuples contain 5 elements: <Identifier, Sentence, OS, Source,
Credibility>, where Origin Set (OS) records the assumption nodes upon which it really ultimately
depends (as derived by the theorem prover). In contrast to them, in our model a tuple only store a
sentence and a source, but a tuple does not store the credibility. That is, in our model the plausibility
of a sentence is not explicitly stored with it, as [4] does. Thus, when the plausibility of some sentence
is needed the plausibility function should be applied. As is shown in Example 6, given a sentence α
its plausibility depend on its proofs (α-kernels). Therefore, if one of the sentences of these proof
changes, then the plausibility of α may change. Hence, if the credibility order is replaced, then the
sentence plausibility may change without changing the belief base.
Example 6 Consider a set Agents = {A1, A2} where the credibility order is A1 ≤Co A2, KA1 =
{(α,A1), (α → β,A2)} and KA2 = {(α,A2)}. By Definition 8, Pl(β,KA1) = A1. Now, suppose
that A1 receives from A2 the belief α. Now KA1 = {(α,A1), (α,A2), (α → β,A2)} and A1 has two
derivations for β, hence Pl(β,KA1) = A2. Observe that plausibility of β is increased.
The communication policy among agents is other difference that we can note with respect to us
approach. The communication policy that we have showed in Section 3.4 differs from the one [4]
where the agents do not communicate the sources of the assumptions, but they present themselves as
completely responsible for the knowledge they are passing on; receiving agents consider the sending
ones as the sources of all the assumptions they are receiving from them. In Figure 2 the difference is
shown. In (a) is our approach and in (b) the Dragoni’s approach.
Figure 2: Communication policy
In (b) we can see that if an agent retransmits one belief, the original source is lost. In contrast to
this, in our approach the agents hold their beliefs with the more credible informant known.
5 CANTWELL’S APPROACH VS. OUR APPROACH
In [3] Cantwell shows how a support ordering on the information can be generated and how it can
be used to decide what information to accept and what not to accept. In this work, in contrast to our
approach [16], a scenario (set of incoming information) presented by a source is treated as a whole
and not sentence by sentence, and therefore, it can be inconsistent.
Besides, in [3] a relation of trustworthiness is introduced over sets of sources and not between
single sources. Moreover, if two sources give the same piece of information φ, and a single agent
gives ¬φ, then φ will be preferred, that is, the decision is based on majority. This is shown in the
following example.
Example 7 Let A1, A2 and A3 be three sources that are more or less equally trustworthy, now if A1
and A2 both give the piece of information φ while A3 gives the information ¬φ one would probably
be inclined towards accepting φ rather than ¬φ as the joint trustworthiness of A1 and A2 would
typically be greater than that of A3. To capture this Cantwell introduced a relation of trustworthiness
not between single sources, but between sets of sources.
In Cantwell’s approach the order in which the evidence is considered does not seem to be impor-
tant. However, in the following example it is shown that in our work the order in which beliefs are
considered is important.
Example 8 Consider a set Agents = {A1, A2, A3} where the credibility order is A1 ≤Co A2,
A2 ≤Co A3, A3 ≤Co A2. Note that A2 is as credible as A3. Suppose that the belief base of A1
is empty. If A1 receives the tuple (α,A2) and then receives (¬α,A3), then (¬α,A3) will be rejected.
However, if A1 first receives the tuple (¬α,A2) and then receives (α,A3), then (α,A3) will be re-
jected.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper we have introduced an analysis of the different research lines of MABR based on the
hierarchy presented in [13]. Namely, we have focused in MSBR and briefly we have described our
approach recently presented [16]. Then, we have compared our approach with two other models
(Dragoni’s approach [4, 5] and Cantwell’s approach [3]) that cope with Multiple Sources Belief Re-
vision (MSBR). Like us, both consider that the reliability of the source affects the credibility of
incoming information, and this reliability is used to decide whether a received formula is accepted or
rejected. However, these two approaches differs from ours in several issues.
In [4, 5] is considered that agents detect and store in tables the nogoods and the good. In contrast
to our approach, they do not remove beliefs to avoid a contradiction, but, quite more generally, to
choose which is the new preferred good among them in knowledge base. This strategy is similar to
“Maxichoice revision” of AGM. In our model, rather than that, we obtain the kernel sets to cut some
sentences, thus we broke the contradictions if it is necessary.
Like us, they propose to store additional information with each sentence. However, their tuples
contain 5 elements: <Identifier, Sentence, OS, Source, Credibility>. In contrast to them, in our
model a tuple only store a sentence and a source, but a tuple does not store the credibility. That is, in
our model the plausibility of a sentence is not explicitly stored with it, as [4] does. Thus, when the
plausibility of some sentence is needed the plausibility function should be applied.
The communication policy that we have showed in Section 3.2 differs from the one [4] where the
agents do not communicate the sources of the assumptions, but they present themselves as completely
responsible for the knowledge they are passing on; receiving agents consider the sending ones as the
sources of all the assumptions they are receiving from them.
In [3], a scenario (set of incoming information) presented by a source is treated as a whole and not
sentence by sentence, and therefore, it can be inconsistent. A relation of trustworthiness is introduced
over sets of sources and not between single sources. Besides, if two sources give the same piece of
information φ, and a single agent gives ¬φ, then φ will be preferred, that is, the decision is based
on majority. In his approach, the order in which the evidence is considered does not seem to be
important. However, in our work, the order in which beliefs are considered is important: If an agent
receives α and then receives ¬α and both have the same plausibility, then ¬α will be rejected.
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